i This document is a technical overview and discussion of our work, a protocol for secure group messaging. By secure we mean for the actual users i.e. end-to-end security, as opposed to "secure" for irrelevant third parties.
Our work provides everything needed to run a messaging session between real users on top of a real transport protocol. That is, we specify not just a key exchange, but when and how to run these relative to transport-layer events; how to achieve liveness properties such as reliability and consistency, that are time-sensitive and lie outside of the send-receive logic that cryptography-only protocols often restrict themselves to; and offer suggestions for displaying accurate (i.e. secure) but not overwhelming information in user interfaces.
We aim towards a general-purpose unified protocol. In other words, we'd prefer to avoid creating a completely new protocol merely to support automation, or asynchronity, or a different transport protocol. This would add complexity to the overall ecosystem of communications protocols. It is simply unnecessary if the original protocol is designed well, as we have tried to do.
That aim is not complete -our full protocol system, as currently implemented, is suitable only for use with certain instant messaging protocols. However, we have tried to separate out conceptually-independent concerns, and solve these individually using minimal assumptions even if other components make extra assumptions. This means that many components of our full system can be reused in future protocol extensions, and we know exactly which components must be replaced in order to lift the existing constraints on our full system.
Our main implementation is a JavaScript library; an initial version is awaiting integration into the MEGA web chat platform. We also have a Python reference prototype that is semi-functional but omits real cryptographic algorithms. Both our design and implementation need external review. To that end, this document contains highlevel descriptions of each, and we have also published source code and API documentation under the free open source software AGPL-3 license.
In chapters 1 and 2, we explore topics in secure group messaging in general, then apply these to our work and justify our design choices. In chapter 3, we present our full protocol system, including our chosen separations of concerns and how we achieve various security properties. In chapter 4, we describe our implementation, including our software architecture, along with paradigms we employ in lower-level utilities. In chapter 5, we detail our crytographic algorithms and our packet format. Finally in chapter 6, we outline future work, both for the immediate short term as well as long-term research objectives.
Model and mechanics
First, we present an abstract conceptual model of a private group session and introduce some terminology. Secure communication systems generally consist of the following steps:
0. Identity (long-term) key validation.
1. Session membership change (e.g. establishment or optional termination).
Session communication.
We only concern ourselves with (1) and (2). We assume that (0), a.k.a. the "PKI problem", is handled by an external component that the application interacts directly with, bypassing our components. Even if it is not handled safely, this does not affect the functionality of our components; but the application should display a warning 1 and record this fact and/or have the user complete that step retroactively.
A session (as viewed by a subject member, at a given time) is formed from a set of transport packets, which the protocol interprets logically as a set of messages and a session membership. Each message has a single author and a set of readers; the message membership is the union of these. Messages have an order relative to each other, that may be represented (without loss of information) as a set of parent messages for each message; and relative to the session boundary, i.e. when the subject decides to join and part.
Whilst part of a session, members may change the session membership, send new messages to the current session membership, and receive these events from each other. Events are only readable to those who are part of the session membership of the event generator, when they generated it. For example, joining members cannot read messages that were written before the author saw them join (unless an old member leaks the contents to them, outside of the protocol). 2 1 For example, "WARNING: the authenticity and privacy of this session is dependant on the unknown validity of the binding $key ↔ $user" or perhaps something less technical. 2 We don't yet have a good model of what it should precisely mean to rejoin a session. This "happens to work" with what we've implemented, but is not easily extensible to asynchronous messaging. Specifically, it's unclear how best to consistently define the relative ordering of messages across all members. We will explore this topic in more depth in the future.
On the transport level, we assume an efficient packet broadcast operation, that costs time near-constant in the number of recipients, and bandwidth near-linear (or less) in the number of recipients or the size of the packet. Note that the sender and recipients of a transport packet are concepts distinct from the author and readers of a logical message; our choice of terminology tries to make this clear and unambiguous.
For completeness, we observe that a real system often unintentionally generates "side channel" information, beyond the purpose of the model. This includes the time, space, energy cost of computation; the size, place of storage; the time, size, route of communications; and probably more that we've missed. Often it is impossible to avoid generating some of this information.
In summary, we've enumerated the broad categories of information in our model: membership, ordering, content, and side channels. Next, we'll discuss and classify the security properties we might want, then consider these properties in the context of each of these categories.
Security properties
In any information network, we produce and consume information. This could be explicit (e.g. contents) or implicit (e.g. metadata). From this very general observation, we can suggest a few fundamental security properties:
Efficiency
Nobody should be able to cause anyone to spend resources (i.e. time, memory, or bandwidth) much greater than what the initiator spent.
Authenticity
Information should be associated with a proof, either explicit or implicit, that consumers may use to verify the truth of it.
Confidentiality
Only the intended consumers should be able to access and interpret the information.
We'll consider authenticity and confidentiality as applied to the categories of information we listed above. (Efficiency is more fiddly and we'll discuss it in narrower terms later, applied to specific parts of our protocol system.)
Here is a summary of current known best techniques for achieving each property. Though we don't try to achieve all of them in our protocol system, being aware of them allows us to avoid decisions that destroy the possibility to achieve them in the future. Existence  automatic  research topic  Side channels unneeded  research topic  Membership  via crypto  research topic  Ordering  via crypto  not explored yet  Contents  via crypto  via crypto Auth. of session existence This is achieved automatically by authenticity of any of the other types; we don't need to worry about it on its own.
Authenticity Confidentiality

Conf. of session existence
This is the hardest to achieve, and is an ongoing research topic. This is the scenario where the user must hide the fact that they are merely using the protocol, even if the attacker knows nothing about any actual sessions. Not only does it require confidentiality of all the other types of information, but also obfuscation, steganography, and/or anti-forensics techniques.
Auth. of side channels
We don't care about the authenticity of something we didn't intend to communicate in the first place.
Conf. of side channels Still a research topic, this is a concern because it may be used to break the confidentiality of other types of information.
Auth. of membership
There is some depth to this. The first choice is whether a distinct change session membership operation should exist outside of sending messages. "Yes" means that (e.g.) you can add someone to the session, and they will know this (maybe a window will pop up on their side) even if you don't send them any messages. "No" means that membership changes must always be associated with an actual message that effects this change. This is up to the application; though "no" is generally more suited for asynchronous messaging.
If "yes", we must consider entity aliveness in our membership protocol. This is the property that if we complete the protocol successfully, then we are also sure that our peers have done the same thing. This requires a key confirmation step from joining members, making the protocol last at least 2 rounds. If we don't consider this, then we may use shorter protocols, but then our peers might not know that we changed the session membership until we send them a message, which makes the "yes" choice less useful.
In both cases, authenticating (adding a proof of authorship to) messages is not enough to verify membership, since packets may get dropped, perhaps even against different recipients. We need to wait for all readers to send a reply back to acknowledge their receipt. This is known as reliability (when the author checks it) or consistency (when a reader checks the other readers).
Conf. of membership This is more commonly called unlinkability and is an ongoing research topic. One major difficulty is that the information may be inferred from many different sources, often implicit in the implementation or in the choice of transport, and not explicit in the model. For example:
• It may be inferred from side channels, such as timing or packet size correlations at the senders and recipients, or transport-defined headers that contain routing information. So, we need routing anonymity and padding or chaff mechanisms to protect against this line of attack.
• It may be inferred from content, such as raw signatures or public keys. So, we need confidential authentication mechanisms (defined later) as well as obfuscated transport protocols to protect against this line of attack.
Auth. of ordering
The two types of ordering we identified earlier are: ordering of messages within a session, and session boundary ordering relative to local events. The latter is more commonly known as freshness.
Other systems sometimes claim freshness based on some idea of an absolute clock, but this requires trusting third-party infrastructure and/or the user's local clock being correct. We prefer to avoid such approaches as it makes the guarantees less clear.
Cryptographic guarantees are best; e.g., if we witness (in any order) a hash and its pre-image, then we are sure that the former was generated (i.e. authored) after the latter. To link remote events to our own time, we can arrange for the pre-image to be derived from some unpredictable local event such as generating a random nonce.
Conf. of ordering
This hasn't been explored explicitly in the wider literature, but could help to break confidentiality of other types of information. It's out of scope for us to consider it in more detail right now; sorry.
Auth. of contents
This is a straightforward application of cryptography. To be clear, this is about proving that the author intended to send us the contents. Whether the claims in it are true (including any implicit claim that the contents weren't copied from elsewhere) is another matter. We'll refer back to this later.
Conf. of contents
This is a straightforward application of cryptography.
In conclusion, we've taken a top-down approach to identify security properties that are direct high-level user concerns in a general private group session. We have not considered lower-level properties (e.g. contributiveness, key control) here since they are only relevant to specific implementations; but we will discuss such properties when and if they might affect the ones above.
Threat models
Attackers with different powers may try to break any of the above properties. First, let's define and describe these powers:
Active communications attack (on the entire transport) This is the standard attack that all modern communications systems should protect against -i.e. a transportlevel "man in the middle" who can inject, drop, replay and reorder packets. Generally (and in practise mostly) channels are bi-directional -so we must assume that the attacker, if they are able to target one member, then they are able to target all members, by attacking the channel in the opposite direction.
Since this a baseline requirement, the powers defined below should be taken to include the ability to actively attack the transport during any attack.
Leak identity secrets (of some targets)
This refers to all of the secret material needed for a subject to establish a new session, e.g. with someone that they've never communicated with before. By definition, this is secret only to the subject.
Leak session secrets (of some targets)
This refers to all of the secret material needed for a subject to continue participating in a session they're already part of. This may be secret to only the subject, or shared across all members, or a combination of both.
This may include identity secrets if they must be used to generate/process messages or membership changes. Better protocols would not need them, so that they may be wiped from memory during a session, reducing the attack surface. However, even in the latter case, session secrets still contain entropy from identity secrets; weaker threat models that exclude this are better for modelling attacks on the RNG than on memory; see [11SSEK] .
Corrupt member (of some targets)
This may be either a genuine but malicious member, or a external attacker that has exploited the running system of a genuine member. Unfortunately, it is probably impossible to distinguish the two cases.
We include this for completeness as "the worst case", though it's unclear if this is fundamentally different from many repeated applications of "leak session secrets"; more research is needed here. One difference could be that under the corruption attack, there is no parallel honest instance and the attacker can observe secret computations that don't touch memory, e.g. collecting, using, then immediately discarding entropy.
Now, we enumerate all the concrete things an attacker might be able to do, by applying these attacks to our model of session mechanics. For simplicity, we only consider individual attacks; a full precise formal treatment will need to consider multiple attacks across multiple sessions. In the following, the term "target" refers to the direct target of a secrets-leak or corruption, and the term "current" refers to when that attack happens.
Older sessions (i.e. already-closed)
• read session events (i.e. decrypt/verify messages and membership changes); 3 4
• (participation is not applicable, since the session is already closed).
Current sessions (i.e. opened, not-yet-closed)
• read session events; 4
• participate as targets (i.e. auth/encrypt messages and initiate/confirm membership changes; this includes making false claims or omissions in the contents of messages, such as receipt acknowledgements, which may break other properties like authenticity of ordering or message membership, or invariants on the application layer);
• participate as non-targets (e.g. against the targets); 5 3 It may be theoretically possible to restrict this only to messages authored by non-targets (excluding messages that the target sends), and likewise for membership changes. However, it's unlikely that the complexity of any solution is worth the benefit, since (a) for every member, we'd need to arrange that they can't derive the ability to decrypt their own messages from their session secrets, and (b) even with this protection, the attacker can still just compromise a second member to get the missing pieces. 4 The inability for an attacker to decrypt past messages is commonly known as forward secrecy. Currently are several slightly different formal models for this, but the general idea is the same. 5 This attack is commonly known as key compromise impersonation. As with forward secrecy, there are slightly different models for this.
• (these may apply differently to newer or older parts of the session).
Newer sessions (i.e. not-yet-opened)
• open/join sessions as targets, read their events and participate in them;
• open/join sessions (etc.) as non-targets (e.g. invite a target or intercept or respond to their invitations), read and participate in them;
5
• read session events, participate as targets, or as non-targets, in sessions whose establishment was not compromised as in the previous points. 6 Next, we'll discuss the unavoidable consequences of attacks using these powers, and from this try to get an intuitive idea on the best thing we might be able to defend against:
Active attack Present cryptographic systems have security theorems that state that, when implemented correctly and assuming the hardness of certain mathematical problems, an attacker at this level cannot break the confidentiality and authenticity of message contents, or the authenticity of membership -and therefore also anything that derives their security from these properties.
However, side channel attacks against the confidentiality of membership are feasible; hiding this sufficiently well (and even defining models for all of the side channels) is still a research problem, and it is not known what the maximum possible protection is.
Leak identity secrets (and active attack)
By definition, the attacker may open/join sessions as targets, then read their events and participate in them. However, we may be able to prevent them from doing anything else.
Leak session secrets (and active attack)
By definition, the attacker may participate as targets in current sessions, and read its events, for at least several messages into the future -until members mix in new entropy secret to the attacker. If session secrets also include identity secrets, the attacker also gains the abilities mentioned in the previous point. However, we may be able to prevent them from doing anything else.
Corrupt insider (and active attack)
This is similar to the above, except that there is no chance of recovery by members mixing in entropy, until after the corruption is healed.
As just discussed, under certain attacks we can't protect confidentiality, even for actions of members not directly targeted by that attack. Such is the nature of our group session model. But we could try to protect a related property:
Confidential authenticity
Only the intended consumers should be able to verify the information. (Of course, attackers who break confidentiality, may choose to believe the information even without being able to verify it.)
For every type of information where we want authenticity and confidentiality, we should also aim for confidential authenticity -if the attacker should be unable to read its contents, they should also be unable to verify anything about it. As noted earlier, this is useful not merely for its own sake, but is essential if we want to protect the confidentiality of membership. Furthermore, this property can be removed on a higher layer, e.g. an opt-in method to sign all messages with public signature keys, but once lost it cannot be regained. So it is safer to default to having this property.
Against an active attacker, this means that verification must be executable only by other members, i.e. depend on session secrets. Against a corrupt insider, who is already allowed to perform verification, this means we must choose a deniable or zero-knowledge authentication mechanism, so that they are at least unable to pass this certainty-in-belief onto third parties.
CHAPTER
TWO
TOPICS
This chapter states the goals for our messaging protocol, the constraints we chose, and discusses the issues that occur under these contexts.
Security goals
We do not try to provide confidentiality of session existence, membership, or metadata, under any attack scenario.
(For example, presently-known attacks that break these include timing or other side channel analysis, or simply reading the metadata generated by the normal operation of the transport.) However, we try to avoid incompatibilities with any future systems that do provide those properties, based on our knowledge of existing research and systems that attempt or approximate these.
1
We aim to directly provide confidentiality of message content; authenticity of membership, ordering, and content; and (later) a limited form of confidential authenticity of ordering and content. An overview follows; we will expand on it in more detail in subsequent chapters.
We achieve authenticity and confidentiality of message content, by using modern standard cryptographic primitives with ephemeral session keys. The security of these keys, and the authenticity of session membership and boundary ordering (freshness), are achieved via an authenticated group key agreement protocol. We do not use timestamps.
The authenticity of message ordering is achieved through the authenticity of message content, together with some rules that enforce logical consistency. That is, someone who can authenticate message contents (either an attacker via secrets leak or a corrupt insider) must still adhere to those rules.
The authenticity of message membership (including reliability, consistency) is achieved through the authenticity of message ordering, together with some rules that ensure liveness using timeout warnings and continual retries. This differs from previous approaches [09MPOM] [13GOTR] which achieve those via a separate cryptographic mechanism. We believe that our approach is a cleaner separation of concerns, requiring no extra cryptography beyond author authentication and re-using basic concepts from time-tested reliability protocols such as TCP.
Our choice of mechanisms are intended to retain all these properties when under an active attack on the communication transport. Under stronger attacks, we have lower but still reasonable levels of protection:
Under identity secrets leak against some targets (and active attack):
Older sessions:
• Retain all relevant security properties.
Current sessions:
• Retain all relevant security properties until the next membership change;
• [+] From the next change onwards, properties are as (a), since in our system membership changes require identity secrets to execute.
Newer sessions (a):
Attacker can open/join sessions as the targets of the leak, and read and participate those sessions;
• Attacker cannot open/join sessions as non-targets (those unaffected by the leak), not even with the compromised targets;
• Retain all relevant security properties, for sessions whose establishment was not actively compromised.
Under session secrets leak against some targets (and active attack) (b):
Current sessions:
• [+; partly x] Attacker can read session events;
• [+; partly x] Attacker can participate as targets;
• Attacker cannot participate as non-targets.
Newer sessions:
• [+] as (a); our session secrets unfortunately include identity secrets.
Under insider corruption (and under active attack): As (b) except that entries marked imperfect cannot be improved upon. More specifically, the properties we do retain are:
• Some limited protection against false claims/omissions about ordering;
• (future work) Retain confidential authenticity of ordering and content.
Note that these apply to all lesser attacks too; we mention them explicitly here so that this section is less depressing.
[x] unavoidable, as explained in the previous chapter.
[+] imperfect, theoretically improvable, but we have no immediate plans to.
Distributed systems
Security properties are meant to detect incorrect behaviour; but conflicts in naively-implemented distributed systems can happen even when everyone behaves correctly. If we don't explicitly identify and resolve these situations as not a security problem, but instead allow our security mechanisms to warn or fail in their presence, we reduce the usefulness of the latter. In other words, a warning which is 95% likely to be a false positive, is useless information and a very bad user experience that may push them towards less secure applications.
Generally in a distributed system, events may happen concurrently, so ideally a causal order (directed acyclic graph) rather than a total order (line) should be used to represent the ordering of events. We do this for messages, and this component of our system may be directly reused for asynchronous messaging.
However, group key agreements (GKAs), which is our membership change mechanism, historically have not been developed with this consideration in mind. A direct solution would define the result of merging two concurrent operations, and give an algorithm for both sides of the fork to execute, to reach this result state. But we could not find literature that even mentions this problem, and we are unsure how to begin to approach it. Based on our moderate experience, it seems feasible at least that any solution would be highly specific to the GKA used, limiting our future options for replacing cryptographic components.
For now, we give up causal ordering for membership operations, and instead enforce a linear ordering for them.
To make this easier, we restrict ourselves to a group transport channel, that takes responsibility for the delivery of
channel events (messages and membership changes), reliably and in a consistent order.
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We do not assume this; we detect any deviation from it and notify the user, but our system is efficient if the transport is honest.
Beyond this, there are several more non-security distributed systems issues, that relate to the integration of cryptographic logic in the context of a group transport channel. These situations all have the potential to corrupt the internal state consistency of a naive implementation:
• Two members start different operations concurrently (as mentioned above);
• Two members try to complete an operation concurrently, in different ways; e.g. "send the final packet" vs.
"send a request to abort";
• A user enters the channel during an operation;
• A user leaves the channel during an operation;
• A member starts an operation and sends the first packet to the other channel members , but when others receive it the membership has changed to ′ , or there was another operation that jumped in before it;
• Different operation packets (initial or final) are decodeable by different members, some of which are not part of the cryptographic session. If we're not careful, they will think different things about the state of the session, or of others' sessions;
• Any of the above things could happen at the same time.
We must design graceful, low-failure-rate solutions for all of them. Individual solutions to each of these are fairly straightforward, but making sure that these interact with each other in a sane way is more complex. Then, there is the task of describing the intended behaviour precisely. Only when we have a precise idea on what is supposed to happen, can we construct a concrete system that isn't fragile, i.e. require mountains of patches for corner cases ignored during the initial hasty naive implementations.
User experience
Independently of any actual attack or security warning, the distributed nature of our system requires us to consider how to represent correct information to users. Displaying inaccurate or vague information is a security risk even without an attacker because it can lead the user to believe incorrect things.
Here, we give an overview of these issues and our suggested solutions for them. Avoiding any of these topics is always an option, which case the application will look like -and be as insecure as -existing applications that do the same.
Real parents of a message
Some messages may not be displayed immediately below the one(s) that they are actually sent after, i.e. that the author saw when sending it.
Our suggestion: (a) allow the user to select a message (e.g. via mouse click, long press or keyboard) upon which all non-ancestors are grayed out; and (b) annotate the messages whose parents are not equal to the set {the preceding message in the UI}, as a hint for the user to perform the selection.
Messages sent before a membership change completes, but received afterwards Obviously, this message has a different membership from the current session, and it would be wrong not to display this difference.
Our suggestion: (a) when an operation completes, issue a UI notice about it inline in the messages view; (b) allow the user to select a message to see its membership, instead of trying to infer it from the session membership and any member change notices; and (c) annotate such messages as a hint for the user to perform the selection.
Progress and result of a membership change operation
If the user starts an operation then immediately sends a message, this is still encrypted to the old membership. Unless we explicitly make it clear that operations take a finite time, they may not realise this.
Our suggestion: issue UI notices inline in the messages view, when the user proposes an operation and when it is rejected, is accepted (starts), fails or succeeds; or (optionally) also when others' operations are rejected, are accepted, fail or succeed.
Messages received out-of-order Some messages are sent, but the sent-later ones are received earlier.
Our suggestion: simply ignore the messages that are received too early, until the missing gaps are filled. This might seem counter-intuitive, but there are many reasons that this is the best behaviour, discussed in [msg-2oo] . There are some other options, but we believe these are all strictly worse.
Messages not yet acknowledged by all of its intended readers Here, we are unsure if everyone received what we sent, or received the same messages that we received from others.
Our suggestion: (a) allow the user to select a message to see who has not yet acknowledged it, out of its membership; (b) annotate such messages as a hint for the user to perform the selection, after a grace timeout because it's impossible to satisfy this immediately; and optionally (c) show a progress meter for this condition for every message we send.
Users not responding to heartbeats
This helps to detect transports dropping our messages.
Our suggestion: in the users view, gray out expired users.
A more detailed discussion of these topics is given at [msg-hci].
User experience
CHAPTER
THREE PROTOCOL
Here we present an overview of our protocol, suggested runtime data structures and algorithms, with references to other external documents for more specific information about each subtopic.
Session overview
A session is a local process from the point of view of one member. We don't attempt to reason about nor represent an overall "group" view of a session; in general such views are not useful for accurately modelling, or implementing, security or distributed systems.
A session, time-wise, contains a linear sequence of session membership change operations, that (if and when completed successfully) each create subsessions of static membership, where members may send messages to each other.
Linearity is enforced through an acceptance mechanism, which is applied to the packets where members try to start or finish an operation. The sequence is also context-preserving, i.e. it is guaranteed that no other operations complete between when a member proposes one, and it being accepted by the group.
Each accepted operation is initialised from (a) previous state (the result of the previous operation, or a null state if the first) that encodes the current membership may finish with success, upon which we atomically change to a new subsession for , and store the result state for the next operation; or with failure, upon which we destroy all temporary state related to , and continue using the existing subsession with membership
After a successful change, the now-previous subsession (with membership ′ ) enters a shutdown phase. This happens concurrently and independently of other parts of the session, such as messaging in the new subsession or subsequent membership change operations on top of .
Group key agreement
Our group key agreement is composed of the following two subprotocols:
• a group DH exchange to generate a shared ephemeral secret encryption key, for confidentiality;
• a custom group key distribution protocol for per-member ephemeral public signature keys, for authenticity (of session membership) and freshness, piggy-backed onto the same packets as the group DH packets.
The keys are used to read/write messages in the subsession created by the operation. Identity secrets are not needed for this, but they are needed for participating in further membership changes (i.e. creating new subsessions).
1 Our first group key agreement implementation did not enforce atomic operations. This caused major problems when users would leave the channel at different times, e.g. if they disconnect or restart the application, since their GKA components would see different packets and reach different states. With atomic operations and our transport integration rules, an inconsistent state is only reached if the transport (e.g. chat server) behaves incorrectly. One of our goals is, that security warnings fire only when there is actually (or likely to be) a problem.
For the overall protocol, the number of communication rounds is ( ) in the number of members. The average size of GKA packets is also ( ). More modern protocols have (1) rounds but retain ( ) packet size. However, our protocol is a simple first approach using elementary cryptography only, which should be easier to understand and review. This component may be upgraded or replaced independently of the other parts of our protocol system. For example, more modern techniques make the key agreement itself deniable via a zero-knowledge proof. We have skipped that for now to solve higher-priority concerns first, and because implementing such protocols correctly is more tricky. This is discussed further in Future work.
Transport integration
We have the initial packet of each operation, reference the final packet of the previous finished operation (or null if the first). Likewise, the final packet of each operation references (perhaps implicitly, if this is secure) a specific initial packet. The concurrency resolver simply accepts the earliest packet in the channel with a given parent reference, and rejects other such packets. We also define a chain hash built from the sequence of accepted packets, that members verify the consistency of after each operation finishes.
The advantage of this implicit agreement is that it has zero bandwidth cost, generalises to any membership change protocol, and does not depend on the liveness of a particular member as it would if we had an explicit leader.
There are further details and cases in both the algorithm and implementation. For example, we have additional logic to handle new members who don't know the previous operation, and define a general method to authenticate the parent references. We also arrange the code carefully to behave correctly for 1-packet operations, where the packet acts both as an initial and a final packet in our definitions above.
To cover the other Distributed systems cases, we also have a system of rules on how to react to various channel and session events. These work roughly along these principles:
• Every operation's target members (i.e. joining members and remaining members) must all be in the channel to see the first packet (otherwise it is ignored) and remain there for the duration of the operation (otherwise it auto-fails).
• Members that leave the channel are automatically excluded from the session, and vice versa. There are subrules to handle events that conflict with this auto-behaviour, that might occur before those behaviours are applied.
• We never initiate membership operations to exclude ourselves. When we want to part the session, we initiate a shutdown process on the subsession, wait for it to finish, then leave the channel. When others exclude us, we wait for them to kick us from the channel, if and after the operation succeeds. Either way, we switch to a "null/solo" subsession only after leaving the channel.
For full details of our agreement mechanism, our transport integration rules, and the rationale for them, along with more precise descriptions of our model for a general and of a group transport channel, see [msa-5h0].
Message ordering
As discussed previously and elsewhere [msg-2i0] messages may be sent concurrently even in a group transport channel, and so we represent the transcript of messages as a cryptographic causal order. We take much inspiration from Git and OldBlue [12OBLU] for our ideas.
Every message has an explicit set of references to the latest other messages ("parents") seen by the author when they wrote the message. These references are hashes of each packet, which require no extra infrastructure to generate or resolve. When we decrypt and verify a packet, we verify the author of these references as well. This allows us to ignore the order of packet receipt, and instead construct our ordering by following these references. If we receive a packet out-of-order, i.e. if we haven't yet received all of its parents, we simply defer processing of it until we have received them.
Transport integration
References must at least be second-preimage-resistant, with the pre-image being some function of the full verifieddecrypted referent message (i.e. content, parents, author and readers), so that all members interpret them consistently.
Our definition based on hashing packet ciphertext, together with using a shared group encryption key, guarantees the above property for our case. However to be precise, it is important to note that such references are only claims. Their truth is susceptible to lying; the claimant may:
• make false claims, i.e. refer to messages they haven't seen; second pre-image resistance gives some protection here, but an attacker could e.g. reuse a hash value that they saw from another member;
• make false omissions, i.e. not refer to messages that they have seen.
We have rules that enforce some logical consistency across references:
• a message's parents must form an anti-chain, i.e. none of these parents may directly or indirectly (via intermediate messages) reference each other;
• an author's own messages must form a total order (line).
This gives some protection against arbitrary lies, but it is still possible to lie within these constraints. Nevertheless, we omit protection for the latter, since we believe that there is no benefit for an attacker to make such lies, and that the cost of any solution would not be worth the minor extra security.
For a more detailed exploration, including tradeoffs of the defer processing approach to strong ordering, and ways to calculate references to have better resistance against false claims, see [msg-2o0] .
Reliability and consistency
Due to our strong ordering property, we can interpret parent references as an implicit acknowledgement ("ack") that the author received every parent. Based on this, we can ensure end-to-end reliability and consistency. We take much inspiration from the core ideas of TCP.
We require every message (those we write, and those we read) to be acked by all (other) readers; if we don't observe these within a timeout, we warn the user. We may occasionally resend the packets of those messages (the subjects of such warnings), including those authored by others. Resends are all based on implicit conditions; we have no explicit resend requests as in OldBlue.
To ensure we ack everything that everyone wrote, we also occassionally send acks automatically outside of the user's control. Due to strong ordering, acks are transitive (i.e. implicitly ack all of its ancestors) and thus auto-acks can be delayed to "batch" ack several messages at once and reduce volume.
We develop some extra details to avoid perpetual reacking-of-acks, yet ensure that the final messages of a session, or of a busy period within a session, are actually fully-acked. We also include a formal session shutdown process.
For a more detailed exploration, including resend algorithms, timing concepts, different ack semantics, why we must have end-to-end authenticated reliability instead of "just using TCP", the distinction between consistency and consensus, and more, see [msg-2c0] .
Message encryption
For now, message encryption is very simple. Each subsession has a constant set of keys (the output of the group key exchange) that are used to authenticate and encrypt all messages in it -one encryption key shared across all members, and one signature key for each member, with the public part shared with others.
Every message is encrypted using the shared encryption key, then signed by the author using their own private signature key. To decrypt, the recipient first verifies the signature, then decrypts the ciphertext.
These are constant throughout the session, so that if the shared encryption key is broken, the confidentiality of message content is lost. In the future, we will experiment with implementing this component as a forward secrecy ratchet. Note that we already have forward secrecy between subsessions.
There is also the option to add a weak form of deniability, where authenticity of message contents are deniable, but authenticity of session participation is not. This is essentially the group analogue of how deniability is achieved in OTR [OTR-spec], and has equivalent security. (As mentioned before, making the group key agreement itself deniable is stronger, but more complex to achieve.) These directions are discussed further in Future work.
CHAPTER
FOUR ENGINEERING
In this chapter we describe the reference implementation of our protocol system, its architecture and core engineering concepts.
For a distributed system, the only requirement for it to work is that the protocol is well-defined. However, protocols that support advanced features or give strong guarantees are inherently more complex. Some people may argue that the complexity is not worth the benefit, especially if it includes new ideas untested by existing protocols.
Our hope is that a high-level description of an implementation will help moderate this over-estimation of the complexity. Another hope is that it will make audits and code reviews easier and faster.
Public interface
We begin by observing that any implementation of any communications system must (a) do IO with the network; and (b) do IO with the user. In our system, we define the following interfaces for these purposes:
This models a group messaging session as described in Background. It defines an interface for higher layers (e.g. the UI) to interact with, which consists of (a) one input method to send a message or change the session membership; (b) one output mechanism for the user to receive session events or security warnings; and (c) various query methods, such as to get its current membership, the stream of messages accepted so far, etc.
1
GroupChannel (interface) [$]
This represents a group transport channel. It defines an interface for higher layers (e.g. a Session) to interact with, which consists of (a) one input method to send a packet or change the channel membership; (b) one output mechanism to receive channel events; and (c) various query methods. Actions may be ignored by the transport or satisfied exactly once, possibly after we receive further channel events not by us. The transport is supposed to send events to all members in the same order, but members must verify this.
[$] This component is specific to instant or synchronous messaging; ones not marked with this may be reused in an asynchronous messaging system.
Session represents a logical view from one user; there is no distinction between "not in the session" vs. "in the session, and we are the only member". By contrast, GroupChannel is our view of an external entity (the channel), and the analogous concepts for channel membership are distinct.
So to use our library, an external application must:
1. Implement GroupChannel for the chosen transport, e.g. XMPP.
2. Construct an instance of HybridSession (see below), passing an instance of (1) to it along with any other configuration options it wants.
3. Hook the application UI into the API provided by Session. The transport layer may be ignored completely, since that is handled by our system. The last step may involve a lot of work if the application UI is too tightly coupled with the specifics of a particular protocol. But there is no way around this; a secure messaging protocol deals with concepts that are fundamentally different from insecure transport protocols, and we see this already by the difference between session and channel membership. Hopefully whoever does this work will architect their future software with greater foresight.
The remainder of this document details the internals of our implementation; but knowledge beyond this point is not necessary merely to use our system.
Session architecture
HybridSession [$] is our main (and currently only) Session implementation. It contains several internal components:
• a GroupChannel, a transport client for communication with the network;
• a concurrency resolver, to gracefully prevent membership change conflicts;
• a component [*] that manages and runs membership operations and proposals;
• two components for the current and previous subsession; each contains:
-a message encryptor/decryptor [*] for communicating with the session;
-a transcript data structure to hold accepted messages in the correct order;
-various liveness components to ensure reliability and consistency.
HybridSession itself handles the various transport integration cases; creates and destroys subprocesses to run membership operations; and manages membership changes that are initiated by the local user, that require more tracking such as retries in the case of transport hiccups, etc.
The receive handler roughly runs as follows. For each incoming channel event:
1. if it is a channel membership change, then react to as part of Transport integration;
2. else, if it is a membership operation packet:
• if it is relevant to the concurrency resolver, pass it to that, which may cause an operation to start or finish (with success or failure);
• if an operation is ongoing, pass it to the subprocess running that;
• else reject the packet (i.e. don't queue it for another try later).
3. else, try to verify-decrypt it as a message in the current subsession;
• if the packet verifies but fails to be accepted into the transcript due to missing parents, put it in a queue specific to this subsession, to try this process again later (and similarly for the next case);
4. else, try to verify-decrypt it as a message in the previous subsession;
5. else, put it on a queue, to try this process again later, in case it was received out-of-order and depends on missing packets to decrypt.
The components that deal directly with cryptography are marked [*] above. These may be improved independently from the others, and from HybridSession. We may also replace the cryptographic primitives within each component -e.g. DH key exchange, signature schemes, hash functions and symmetric ciphers -as necessary, based on the recommendations of the cryptography community.
For more technical details, see our API documentation [mpenc-api].
Internal components
ServerOrder [$]
The concurrency resolver, used by HybridSession to enforce a consistent and context-preserving total
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ordering of membership operations. It tracks the results of older operations, whether we're currently in an operation, and decides how to accept/reject proposals for newer operations.
Greeter, Greeting (interface) [$]
Greeting represents a multi-packet operation. It defines an interface with a packet-based transport consisting of (a) one input method to receive data packets; (b) one output mechanism to send data packets; and (c) various query methods, such as to get a Future for the operation's result, a reference for the previous operation if there was one, the intended next membership, etc. Typically, this may be implemented as a state machine.
Greeter is a factory component for new Greeting instances, defined as an interface used by HybridSession that consists of some limited codec methods for initial/final packets of a group key agreement. Implementations of these methods may reasonably depend on state, such as the result of any previous operation, data about operations proposed by the local user but not yet accepted by the group, or a reference to an ongoing Greeting.
SessionBase
This is a partial Session implementation, for full implementations to build around (as HybridSession does). It enforces properties such as strong message ordering, reliability, and consistency, based on information from message parent references and using some of the components below.
The component provides an interface with a packet-based transport consisting of (a) one input method to receive data packets; (b) one output mechanism to send data packets; and an interface with the UI consisting of (c) one output mechanism for the user to receive notices; (d) various action methods for the user to use, such as sending messages and ending the session; and (e) various query methods similar to those found in
Session.
Unlike Session (a), we make no attempt to simplify SessionBase (d) to make it "nice to use". The functionality is quite low-level and may change in the future; it is not meant for external clients of our system.
Everything from here on are components of SessionBase; HybridSession does not directly interact with them (except MessageLog).
MessageSecurity (interface)
This defines an interface for the authentication and encryption of messages. The interface is flexible enough to allow implementations to generate new keys based on older keys, and to implement automatic deletion rules for some of those keys as they age further.
Transcript, MessageLog
These are append-only data structures that hold messages in causal order.
Transcript holds a causal ordering of all messages, including non-content messages used for flow control and other lower-level concerns. It provides basic query methods, and graph traversal and recursive merge algorithms. (The latter is for aiding future research topics, and directly used yet. It may be omitted in a time-constrained pragmatic reimplementation of our system.) MessageLog is a user-level abstraction of Transcript; it linearises the underlying causal order for UX purposes, aggregates multiple transcripts together (from multiple subsessions), and filters out non-content messages whilst retaining causal ordering.
FlowControl
This defines an interface that SessionBase consults on liveness issues, such as when to resend messages, how to handle duplicate messages, how to react to packets that have been buffered for too long, etc. The interface is designed to support using the same component across several SessionBase instances, in case one wishes to make decisions based on all of their states. The interface is private for the time being, since it is a bit unstructured and may be changed later to fix this and other imperfections.
ConsistencyMonitor
This tracks expected acknowledgements for abstract items, and issues warnings and/or tries to recover, if they are not received in a timely manner. It is used by SessionBase and (in the future) ServerOrder.
PresenceTracker
This tracks our and others' latest activity in a session, and issues warnings if these expire. This helps to
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detect drops by an unreliable transport or malicious attacker. It can send out heartbeats to prevent or recover from such situations, but this is optional since it has some bandwidth cost.
Utilities
Our protocol system is built from components that act as independent processes, that react to inputs and generate outputs similar to the actor model. We build up a relatively simple framework for this intra-process IO, based on some low-level utilities. We'll talk about these first.
Low-level
For an input mechanism into a component that is decoupled from the source, we simply use a function, since this exists in all major languages, and already has the property that the callee doesn't know who the caller is.
For an output mechanism from a component that is decoupled from the target, we use a synchronous publishsubscribe pattern. There are other options; the main reason we choose this is that how we consume inputs (of a given type) changes often. For example: each new message adds a requirement that we do some extra things on future messages; in trial decryption, the set of possible options changes; etc. Pub-sub is ideal for these cases: we can subscribe new consumers when we need to, and define their behaviour and cancellation conditions close together in the source code.
By contrast, other intra-process IO paradigms (e.g. channels) are mostly built around single consumers. Here, we'd have to collect all possible responses into the consumer, then add explicit state to control the activation of specific responses. This causes related concerns to be separated too much, and unrelated concerns to be grouped together too much, and the mechanisms for doing this are less standardised across common libraries.
By synchronous we mean that the publisher executes subscriber callbacks in its own thread. There are reentrancy issues around this 2 , but in our simple usage it makes reasoning about execution order more predictable, and means that we have no dependency on any specific external execution framework.
For long-running user operations, we use Futures, which is the standard utility for this sort of asynchronous "function call"-like operation, that is expected to return some sort of response. In our system, a common pattern is for a Future's lifetime to include several IO rounds between components.
We chose to implement our own utilities for some of these things, to define them in a more abstract style that is inspired from functional programming languages. This allows us to write higher-order combinators, so that we can express complex behaviours more concisely and generally.
Observable
A pair of functions (publish, subscribe) and some mutable tracking state, used to produce and consume items. The producer creates an instance of this, keeps (publish) private and gives (subscribe) to potential consumers. In a language that supports polymorphic types, we would have the following type definitions, written in Scala-like pseudocode:
() => Boolean type Subscribe[T, S] = (T => S) => Cancel type Publish[T, S] = T => List[S]
T is the type of the communicated item, and S is an optional type (default (), called void in some languages) that callbacks may want to pass back to the producer, to signal some sort of "status". The return value of Cancel is whether the subscription was not already cancelled.
Even if absent from the language, having an idea on what types ought to be helps us to write combinators, e.g. to make a complex subscribe function ("run A after event X but run B instead if event Y happens first 2 Reentrant publish is when callbacks cause the producer to produce new items whilst they are being run. This can cause unintended behaviour, sometimes called an interleaving hazard, and is usually considered a bug. See also §13.1. Sequential Interleaving Hazards in [06ROBO] .
Reentrant subscribe/cancel is when subscriptions for the current producer are modified whilst we are running the callbacks for one of its items. The behaviour here must be precisely defined by the pub-sub system. For example, web DOM events define that cancels take affect from the current run, but subscribes only take effect from the next run. and run A2 if event X happens after that") or a complex cancel function ("cancel all in set X and if all of them were already cancelled then also cancel all in set Y").
EventContext
A utility that supports efficient prefix-matched subscriptions, so consumers can specify a filter for the items they're interested in. The type signature of its public part is something like _Prefix_[T] => Subscribe[T, S], pretending for now that _Prefix_ is a real type.
Timer
Execute something in the future. Its type is simply Subscribe[Time, Unit] so that it can be used with combinators. When integrating our library into an application, one can simply write an adapter that satisfies this interface, for whichever execution framework is used.
Future
We only use these for user-level actions, so we don't need many combinators for them. Standard libraries are adequate for our use cases, e.g. Promise (JS) or defer.Deferred (Python).
We also have more complex utilities such as Monitor, built on top of Observable and its friends, used to implement liveness and freshness behaviours. For more details, see the API documentation [mpenc-api].
High-level
We define two interfaces (trait or typeclass in some languages) as a common pattern for our Actor-like components to follow. Each interface is a (function, subscribe-function) pair. The former is to provide input into the component, the latter to accept output from it.
One interface is for interacting with a more "high level" component, e.g. a user interface: For example, when the UI wants to send some things to our session, it passes this request to Session.send. To display things received from the session, it hooks into Session.onRecv.
Another interface is for interacting with a more "low level" component, e.g. a transport client: For example, when we want to tell a GKA session membership operation that we received a packet for it, we call Greeting.recv. To service its requests to send out response packets, we hooks into Greeting.onSend. Here are some examples of our components that implement the above interfaces: These interfaces are also used privately too, to maintain a common style for the code architecture. For example HybridSession contains an implementation of SendingReceiver[ChannelNotice, ChannelAction], but this is not exposed since it is just an implementation detail, and it is only meant to be linked with the associated GroupChannel.
We define S for Subscribe[T, S] as Boolean in these interfaces for simplicity, meaning "the item was {accepted, rejected} by the consumer". This allows us to detect errors -such as transport failures in sending messages, or trial decryption failures in receiving packets -but in a loosely-coupled way that discourages violation of the separation of layers. One reasonable extension for the future, is to use a 3-value logic to represent {accept, try later, reject}, which helps both of the previous cases.
This concludes the overview of our reference implementation. All the code that is not mentioned here, is a straightforward application of software engineering principles or algorithm writing, as applied to our protocol design (previous chapter) and software design (this chapter). For more details, see the API documentation [mpencapi] and/or source code.
CHAPTER
FIVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
Here, we document the specifics of how we use and implement cryptography in our protocol, and describe the information contained in our packets.
This is not an overview of our full protocol system. Beyond processing and generating packets, other algorithms and data structures must be implemented to ensure a coherent high-level understanding of the state of the session, and the ability to actively react to wider concerns such as liveness and consistency of session state. These latter topics are covered in Protocol.
Packet overview
Every packet in our protocol is a sequence of records, similar to HTTP headers. Each record has a type and a value, and some records may appear multiple times.
There are two packet types: (a) packets part of a membership change operation, that we sometimes also call greeting packets or greeting messages; and (b) packets that represent a logical message written by members of the session.
Both packet types include the following common records, that occur either at or near the start of the sequence, in order:
• MESSAGE_SIGNATURE -This is a cryptographic signature for the rest of the packet. This is calculated differently for greeting and data packets, defined in the respective sections below.
• PROTOCOL_VERSION -This indicates the protocol version being used, as a 16-bit unsigned integer. Our current version is 0x01.
• MESSAGE_TYPE -Indicates the packet type, GREETING or DATA.
Membership changes
Our membership change protocol consists of two subprotocols, one to derive an ephemeral encryption key and one to derive ephemeral signature keys.
More modern protocols with better security properties exist, but ours is a simple approach using elementary cryptography only, which should be easier to understand and review. It will be improved later, but for now is adequate for our stated security goals, and was quick to implement.
The subprotocols are described in the following chapters; please read these first. We introduce some terminology there, that is needed to understand the rest of this document.
Group Key Agreement (GKA)
The group key agreement is conducted according to CLIQUES [00CLIQ] . We modify the protocol to use ECDH based on x25519 instead of classic DH, since it is superior in all attributes -faster to process, smaller keys to transport and store, and existing libraries are simpler to interface with. It negotiates a shared group key for members in a total of ( ) messages sent, and re-negotiates (single-member) include, exclude or key refresh in (1) messages, assuming broadcasts are available.
The CLIQUES key agreement algorithm is based on the Group-Diffie-Hellman (GDH) concept, in which each participant generates a private contributory key portion for the session. This will be computed into the (public) intermediate keys passed between the members. At the end of the process, a set of intermediate keys will be available to all, with each of them lacking the private contribution of exactly one participant. Each participant uses that one respective intermediate key missing their own contribution to compute the same shared group key.
Based on this GDH concept two related protocols are constructed: The initial key agreement (IKA) and the auxiliary key agreement (AKA). IKA is used for an initial key agreement with no initial knowledge of intermediate keys of the other parties. AKA is a supplementary and simplified protocol to agree on an new, changed group key once the IKA protocol has successfully terminated. It is executed on including or excluding participants as well as refreshing the shared group key.
Besides their slightly different actions within the group key agreement (e.g. initiator of upflow or of downflow, see below), no participant of the IKA or AKA bear a special role. All participants of the CLIQUES key agreement can be considered equal in terms of the protocol functionality.
CLIQUES does not protect against active attackers. However, in our use of it, all messages are co-located with our Authenticated Signature Key Exchange (ASKE) messages, which authenticates each full message in the whole protocol. Therefore, an active attack is countered by the final ASKE verification step.
Initial Key Agreement (IKA)
The initial key agreement follows the outline of the [00CLIQ] IKA.1 protocol. The protocol contains two phases:
The upflow phase and the downflow phase. In the upflow, each participant generates their private key contribution, and mixes it into the elements of the (growing) chain of intermediate keys. Once everyone has participated in the upflow, the last participant will initiate the downflow by broadcasting the final chain of intermediate keys to all, enabling them to individually compute the group key.
Upflow
The first participant assembles an ordered list of all participants included in the IKA, with themselves as the first element. Then, it generates its private Diffie-Hellman key 1 and computes the corresponding public key using DH exponentation. In the case of mpENC, this is x25519 scalar multiplication with the base point , i.e. Successive participants receiving the upflow messages similarly generate their own private contributions. This contribution is used for computing new intermediate keys using DH exponentation. The previous cardinal generates two items in the new list -itself unaltered, inserted just before the new cardinal key, and also the new cardinal key, which is the previous cardinal key multiplied with their own contribution.
Example:
The following figure shows the sequence of upflow messages ( ) sent among four participants ( ). • Participants: ( 1, 2, 3, 4)
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• Calculate intermediate keys:
(1, 1 ).
• Intermediate keys: ( , 1 ) 2 contains:
• Participants: ( 1, 2, 3, 4)
• Where ; denotes vector concatenation, and init and ckey denote respectively the initial portion and cardinal key (final element) of the intermediate keys contained in .
Downflow
The last participant in the chain performs the same operations by adding their own contributions to the intermediate keys. However, the cardinal key at this stage is complete, containing contributions from everyone. Therefore, the last participant retains the new cardinal key as the shared group secret, and broadcasts the list of other intermediate keys to all other members. After that, the participant has finished their participation in the IKA protocol and possesses the shared group secret, then computes the group key from it.
Each recipient of the downflow message will now be able to take "their" intermediate key out of the list (i.e. the one missing their own contribution). For the -th member in the chain, this is the -th intermediate key. Through DH exponentiation of their own private key contribution with "their" intermediate key, they will all derive the same shared secret. This is the point this participant has also completed its part in the IKA and has transitioned into the ready state.
Example:
The following figure shows the corresponding downflow message ( ) broadcast to all other participants ( ). This group secret is used as input into a KDF to derive further keys to be used for other operations, such as message encryption to the group.
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Auxiliary Key Agreement (AKA)
Once an initialised chat encryption is available for an established group of participants, an auxiliary key agreement (AKA) can be invoked. These runs are necessary for changes in group participants (including new members or excluding existing ones) to update the group secret. Therefore allowing the previous participant set only to read messages before the AKA, and the new participant set to read/write messages after the AKA. Furthermore the AKA can also be used to refresh the group secret, for more fine-grained forward secrecy, by updating a participant's private key contribution.
Member Inclusion
Member inclusion is performed very similarly to the IKA protocol. An existing participant may initiate an upflow for this. First the new participant(s) are appended to the list of existing participants. To avoid the new participants gaining knowledge of the previous group secret, the initiator of the include is required to update its private key contribution in the following fashion:
1. Perform a DH exponentiation with its own private contribution on its "own" intermediate key (as if it was generating the old group secret), then append it to the list of intermediate keys for each new member. Note that this is a secret value and must not be sent yet! The next steps hide it.
2. Generate a new private key contribution (see Updating Private Key Contributions). The last (new) participant in the extended list now will initiate the downflow broadcast message consisting of all intermediate keys, thus enabling every participant to compute the new shared group secret and reach a ready state.
Using the AKA for includes it is possible to add new participants either one by one or multiple at the same time.
It is more efficient to add multiple new participants at the same time than to add them sequentially.
Example:
The following figure shows inclusion of a participant ( 5) -initiated by 1 -to the existing group of four participants.
• Participants: ( 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
• Intermediate keys: ( 4 3 2 , 
Member Exclusion
The AKA protocol flow for member exclusion is similar to -but simpler -than member inclusion. The initiator updates their private key contribution (see Updating Private Key Contributions) in the same manner as for includes above. Then the participant(s) as well as their intermediate key(s) are removed from the respective lists for the participant(s) to be excluded. Now the downflow broadcast message can be sent directly without the need of a preceding upflow phase. Thus, all remaining participants can compute the new shared group secret and reach a ready state.
When using the AKA for exclusion it is possible to remove participants either one by one or multiple at the same time. It is more efficient to remove multiple participants at the same time than to remove them sequentially.
To help more granular forward secrecy over extended periods of key use, it is a good idea to refresh the group secret at suitable intervals (e.g. depending on time, number of messages or volume encrypted with it). A key refresh is very simple, and can be initiated by any participant. The initiating participant renews their own private key contribution (see Updating Private Key Contributions), and broadcasts a downflow message with all updated intermediate keys to all participants without the need of a preceding upflow. Thus, all participants can compute the new shared group key and reach a ready state.
It is wise for participants to track the "age" of their own private key contribution. This mechanism can be used for achieving a "rolling" group secret refresh by always updating the oldest private key contributions of participants.
Member Departure
Member departure is the voluntary parting of a participant rather than an exclusion initiated by another participant. In effect it is the same, with the only difference that the departing member indicates the desire to leave, and a member exclusion AKA will be initiated upon that by another participant.
In mpENC, this is not a direct concern of the GKA, and works the same way independently of the particular GKA we choose. That is, the "desire to leave" is a special data message, sent via the normal mechanism for data messages.
Updating Private Key Contributions
When the private key contribution (for an inclusion, exclusion or refresh) is updated, the client must keep all the key contributions in a list, including old contributions. When performing computations to derive a new cardinal key, this whole list of one's own private key contributions needs to be used.
In theory, these individual contributions can be condensed into a single value, via multiplication modulo the order of the base element (base point in ECC). However, in x25519 only certain values are valid secret keys; secret inputs not in the expected format are coerced 1 into this format, which effectively changes the value used for the actual mathematical scalar multiplication. If we combine secret keys using modular multiplication, this will sometimes result in a value that is effectively corrupted by typical x25519 APIs. So, we cannot do this in practise; we must store all our contributions separately, to be mixed individually into our intermediate key later.
This sequence may grow big over time, so that the overhead of applying a long sequence of elliptic curve scalar multiplications can become more significant. In such cases, it may be worth to re-key the whole session. We have not yet implemented this, but will do so if it becomes a problem in practice.
Additionally, we cannot pre-emptively combine old contributions into the intermediate key, e.g. to add an extra step in our key-update sequence described in Member Inclusion:
4. Perform DH exponentiations on its "own" intermediate key, with the old private key contribution (as from step #1).
This would cause us to reveal the group secret of the previous session, namely 1 5 4 3 2 in the example of the above section, which of course would be a catastrophic security failure.
Authenticated Signature Key Exchange (ASKE)
As previously noted, we must authenticate the user's membership in the session, as well as authenticate the content of their messages. This could easily be accomplished by using static private keys to make signatures. However, this destroys any chance that we might have in the future at retaining deniability (also known as repudiability) of ciphertext. Once this property is lost, we can never regain it in a higher layer, and it is critical for confidentiality of metadata, so it is better to retain it here.
Instead, we generate ed25519 ephemeral signing keys for each participant, to be used to authenticate messages for the current session only. We also derive a session ID from participants' nonces to ensure freshness. At the end of the session the ephemeral private signing key may be published to the transport, allowing for retrospective chat transcript alteration, and therefore allowing repudiation of the contents of transcripts presented post-session. However, our mechanism does not provide deniability of the participation in the authenticated signature key exchange (ASKE) protocol.
Our approach takes some loose inspiration from [06DGKA] and [13DSKE] , and may also be compared with [03SPAG] and [12SDGK] . Both are constructions to turn an unauthenticated GKA into an authenticated one. The former construction is not deniable, whereas the latter is fully deniable (including participation in the session) but requires more advanced cryptography (ring signatures) that have not yet seen widespread usage.
Our GKA protocol consists of an upflow (sequential collect) and downflow (broadcast) phase, whereas our ASKE protocol is a constant-round broadcast protocol, as are the other authenticated agreements referenced above. To make our combined protocol easier to understand, the first broadcast round has been serialised into a "collection phase" upflow. The first broadcast of the last member in the chain is the start of the downflow, which is followed by an acknowledgement broadcast by every other participant. Note that these latter broadcasts are not present in our group key agreement.
ASKE consists of three phases. First each participant generates a nonce and an ephemeral signature key pair, and forwards the nonce and public key (upflow). In the second phase -when in possession of all nonces -each member independently computes the shared session ID, and authenticates their ephemeral signing key and session ID using their static private key (downflow). Lastly, each participant verifies all received acknowledgement messages.
Initial Protocol Run Phase 1 -Collection
In the first phase the session initiator with the participant ID pid compiles an ordered list of all group members (their participant IDs). Additionally an empty list for the all participants' nonces and ephemeral public keys is initialised.
The initiator then generates a nonce and an ephemeral signature key pair ( , ). They add these to the nonces and public keys lists. They then send the participants' list (pid ), nonces list ( ) and public keys list ( ) on to the next member in the list, who again generates a nonce and ephemeral signature key pair to send on.
This phase ends with the last member in the list to add their contributions. This last member is the initiator of the second phase.
• Nonces: ( 1 )
• Ephemeral public signing keys: ( 1 ) 2 contains:
• Nonces: ( 1 , 2 )
• Ephemeral public signing keys: ( 1 , 2 ) 3 contains:
• Nonces: ( 1 , 2 , 3 )
• Ephemeral public signing keys:
Phase 2 -Acknowledgement
The initiator of the downflow in the acknowledgement phase first constructs an authenticator message from their own contributions:
Here, CTX is a fixed byte sequence to prevent the signature being used in another application; for this protocol version we use acksig. sid is the session ID, calculated from all participant IDs and nonces using a hash function :
The IDs and nonces must be strictly ordered. For mpENC on the Mega platform the participant IDs are the full XMPP JIDs, and sorting is performed in lexical order. The nonces are ordered so as to correspond to their participant IDs.
Then, the initiator broadcasts the first message in the downflow, containing the now-completed lists of participants (pid ), nonces ( ) and public keys ( ), for all , along with a signature of their own authenticator message ( ) computed with the static identity signature key ( , ). The purpose of this is to authenticate all information contributed by the signing participant, as well as what they believe the contributions of all session members to be. Example:
The following figure shows the corresponding downflow message ( 4) broadcast to all participants by 4.
1 Although is already "contained in" the session ID, we explicitly add it to , to avoid depending on the security of its calculation. This is hoped to simplify any future formal analysis. • Participants: ( 1, 2, 3, 4)
• Nonces: ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 )
Upon receipt of 4 every other participant sends out an analogous message including their own session signature.
Phase 3 -Verification
This last phase does not require further messages to be sent. Each participant verifies the content of each received acknowledgement broadcast message against their own available information. The purpose is to have the assurance that all participants are actively participating (avoids replays) with a fresh session, and to have the assurance that the session's ephemeral signing keys are really from the users that one is communicating with.
More specifically, as each participant receives each subsequent downflow broadcast from pid , they compute from the same information used to compute their local value for sid, and verify the signature contained in the received message (which is supposed to be ( )) using the sender's long term static key .
The protocol completes successfully when all session signatures from all other participants have been successfully verified against the local session ID and each participant's static identity signature key.
Following successful completion, only the ephemeral keys are needed for message authentication -signing with the static keys would effectively inhibit any plausible deniability. However the static keys are needed for further changes to the session membership.
Auxiliary Protocol Runs
Upon changing the participant composition of the chat (inclusions or exclusions of members) some session information changes: The list of participants, nonces and ephemeral signing keys. Therefore, the session ID also changes.
Member Inclusion
To include participants, the initiator extends the list of participants by the new participant(s). A new collection (upflow) message is sent to the (first) new participant, including the new list of participants and already existing nonces and ephemeral signing keys . The collection upflow percolates through all new participants, and the last one will initiate a new acknowledgement downflow phase followed by a verification phase identically to the initial protocol flow as outlined above.
The following figure shows addition of a participant ( 5) -initiated by 1 -to the existing group of four participants.
• Ephemeral public signing keys: ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) 5 ′ contains:
• Nonces: ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 )
• Ephemeral public signing keys: ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 )
• Session signature: 5 ( 5 )
After receiving this message, 1 through 4 will likewise broadcast their acknowledgement messages to all participants as well as verify all received session signatures ( ).
Member Exclusion
On member exclusion, the process is simpler as it does not require a collection (upflow) phase, as all remaining participants have announced already. The initiator of the exclusion removes the excluded participant(s) from the list of participants, and their respective nonces and ephemeral signing keys are as well removed.
Importantly, the initiator must update their own nonce to prevent collisions in the session ID sid with a previous session ID consisting of the same set of participants. They then compute a new session ID and session signature ( ) from these updated values, and used them to directly broadcast the initial downflow message to all remaining participants. Each of them again verifies all session signatures and broadcasts their own acknowledgement (if still outstanding).
The concept of a key refresh for ASKE is currently not considered.
Member Departure
As with our GKA, our ASKE does not include a member departure operation, this instead being handled in a different part of the wider protocol.
In the future, our departure mechanism will include publishing the ephemeral signature key, to support a limited form of ciphertext deniability. This is described more in Publish signature keys.
Confirmation of the Shared Group Key
The ASKE mentioned above only protects the GKA against external attackers. A malicious insider can cause different participants to generate different shared group keys. We could protect against this by adding the shared group secret 1 . . .
(or better, something derived from it) to the definition of . However, we currently omit this, for the following reasons:
• This would cause a key refresh to require everyone's acknowledgement, adding an extra round to it.
• This attack does no more damage beyond "drop all messages", which is already available to active transport attackers:
-For authenticity of session membership, i.e. entity authentication or freshness, all participants are indeed part of the session, having participated in the ASKE and verified each others' session signatures. They just may have generated different encryption keys.
-For authenticity of message content: each ephemeral signature includes a hash of something derived from the group key, so one will never correctly verify-decrypt a message that was encrypted using a different group key from yours.
-For authenticity of message membership: our other checks (for reliability and consistency) will cause each side of a "split" to timeout and emit security warnings, because the other side was unable to acknowledge them.
However, it is not too much complexity to add such a feature, if the attack turns out to be a real problem. Another benefit of adding the protection would be to make the above argument unnecessary, which reduces the complexity cost of analysing our protocol.
Combined authenticated group key agreement
There are four operation types: establish session, include member, exclude member and refresh group key. Refresh may be thought of as a "no-op" member change and that is how our overall protocol system treats it. Each operation consists of the following stages:
The protocol upflow consists of a series of directed messages; one user sends it to exactly one recipient, i.e. the next member in the MEMBER list of records. It is used to "collect" information from one member to the next. In a transport that only offers broadcast, the other recipients simply ignore packets not meant for them (i.e. the DEST record is not them).
Every upflow message includes the records marked [1] from the summary below. The first upflow message also includes records marked [2], which contains metadata about the operation, used by the concurrency resolver.
This stage is not present for exclude or refresh operations.
Protocol downflow
The protocol downflow consists of a series of broadcast messages, sent to all recipients in the group. It is
Messages
Once a subsession has been set-up after the completion of a membership change, members may exchange messages confidentially (using the shared group key) and authentically (using the ephemeral signing key).
A data packet contains the following records, in order:
• SIDKEY_HINT -A one byte hint, that securely gives the recipient an aid in efficiently selecting the decryption key for this message.
• MESSAGE_SIGNATURE, PROTOCOL_VERSION, MESSAGE_TYPE -as above.
• MESSAGE_IV -Initialisation vector for the symmetric block cipher. The cipher we choose is malleable, to give better deniability when we publish ephemeral signature keys, similar to OTR [OTR-spec].
• MESSAGE_PAYLOAD -Ciphertext payload. The plaintext is itself a sequence of records, as follows:
-MESSAGE_PARENT (multiple) -References to the latest (logical, i.e. data) messages that the author had seen, when they wrote the message.
-MESSAGE_BODY -UTF-8 encoded payload, the message content as written by the human author.
MESSAGE_SIGNATURE is made by the ephemeral signing key and signs the byte sequence CTX|| (sid||gk)||S. CTX is a fixed byte sequence to prevent the signature being injected elsewhere; for data packets in this version, it is datamsgsig. S is the byte sequence of all subsequent records, starting with PROTOCOL_VERSION.
Since a single ephemeral signing key may be used across several subsessions, the (. . . ) value ensures that each ciphertext is verifiably bound to a specific subsession. 2 sid is the session ID (of the subsession) as determined from the ASKE, and gk is the encryption key derived from the GKA.
Padding. We use an opportunistic padding scheme that obfuscates the lower bits of the length of the message. This has not been analysed under an aggressive threat model, but is very simple and cannot possibly be harmful. The scheme is as follows:
• Define a baseline size size_bl. We have chosen 128 bytes for this, to accommodate the majority (e.g. see [08MCIC] ) of messages in chats, while still remaining a multiple of our chosen cipher's block size of 16 bytes.
• The value of MESSAGE_BODY is prepended by a 16-bit unsigned integer (in big-endian encoding) indicating its size.
• Further zero bytes are appended up to size_bl bytes.
• If the payload is already larger than this, then we instead pad up to the next power-of-two multiple of size_bl (e.g. 2 * size_bl, 4 * size_bl, 8 * size_bl, etc) that can contain the payload.
Trial decryption. In general, at some points in time, it may be possible to receive a message from several different sessions. The SIDKEY_HINT record helps to efficiently determine the correct decryption key. We calculate it as (sid||gk) [0] .
Only the first byte of the hash value is used, so it is theoretically possible that values may collide and subsequent trials may be required to determine the correct keys to use. However, this should give a performance improvement in the majority of cases without sacrificing security.
When we implement forward-secrecy ratchets, or when we move to transports that don't provide explicit hints on the authorship of packets, this technique may be adapted further to select between the multiple decryption or authentication keys (respectively) that are available to verify-decrypt packets. Composing this with anonymity systems will need extra care however -if the hint values are the same for related messages, then attackers can identify messages sharing this relationship with greater probability. (This is the case with our scheme above, where we use the same value for all messages in a subsession.)
Encoding and primitives
To encode our records, we use TLV (type, length, value) strings, similar to the OTR protocol. Messages are prepended with the fixed string ?mpENC: followed by a base-64 encoded string of all concatenated TLV records, followed by .. Type and length in the TLV records are each two octets in big-endian encoding, whereas the value is exactly as many octets as indicated by the length.
This encoding may change at a later date.
The cryptographic primitives that we use are:
• Identity signature keys: ed25519
• Session exchange keys: x25519
• Session signature keys: ed25519
• Message encryption: AES128 in CTR mode
• Message references, packet references, trial decryption hints: SHA256
• Key derivation: HKDF-SHA256
These have generally been chosen to match a general security level of 128 bit of entropy on a symmetric block cipher. This is roughly equivalent to 256 bit key strength on elliptic curve public-key ciphers and 3072 bit key strength on traditional discrete logarithm problem based public-key ciphers (e.g. DSA).
We may switch to a more modern block cipher at a future date, that is more easily implementable and verifiable in constant time.
CHAPTER
SIX FUTURE WORK
Here, we discuss tasks for the future, adding functionality and building on our existing security properties.
Immediate
Missing properties
Some of the security mechanisms that we have described, have not actually been implemented yet. We list them below. We have delayed them because we consider them to be less-critical security properties, and wanted to focus on making our implementation work reliably enough to start testing. However, we recognise their importance at providing end-to-end guarantees; none of them are expected to be hard to achieve, and solution outlines have already been sketched out.
Error and abort messages
We should add the ability to abort a membership change, either manually or automatically after a timeout. Currently if someone disconnects, others will be left waiting until they themselves leave the channel. This must be done via an explicit "abort" packet that gets handled by the concurrency resolver, to prevent races between members.
For liveness properties, we already have timeouts that emit local security warnings if good conditions are not reached after a certain time. However, user experience will benefit if we have explicit error messages that inform other members of conditions such as "inconsistent history", that fail-fast more quickly than our generous default timeouts.
Server-order consistency checks
We need to implement consistency checks for accepted operations, since we use the server's packet ordering. This is similar to our consistency checks for messages: expect everyone to send authenticated acks to confirm their view of all previous operations. Further, the parent reference contained within the initial packet must also be authenticated by the initiator.
Together, these prevent the server from re-ordering operations completely arbitrarily. However, given a set of concurrent operations with the same authenticated parent, it is still able to choose which one is accepted, by broadcasting that one first. Given other constraints, we think this security tradeoff is acceptable.
1
Flow control
We need recovery (automatic resends) for dropped messages, and heartbeats to verify in-session freshness.
(We already have security warnings for messages received out-of-order.) This is already implemented in a non-production-ready Python prototype, with random integration tests, and only needs to be ported.
Publish signature keys
We need to make signature-key publishing logic work properly, so that we have deniable authentication for message content.
Roughly, once a member makes a subsession shutdown request (FIN), they may publish their signature key after everyone acks this request. This is safe (i.e. an attacker cannot reuse the key to forge messages), if we enforce that one may not author messages after a FIN, i.e. all receivers must refuse to accept such messages. However, this simple approach destroys our ability to authenticate our own acks of others' messages (e.g. their FIN) after we send our own FIN. So we'll need something a bit more complex, and we haven't worked out the details yet.
If others' acks to our FIN are blocked, then we will never be sure that it's safe to publish our signature key. This likely can't be defended under this type of scheme, since confidential authenticity isn't meaningful without authenticity (it would be "confidential nothing"); the equivalent attack also applies to OTR. To defend against this, we would need a session establishment protocol that is itself deniable, and then we don't need to mess around with publishing keys; see "Better membership change protocol" below.
Next steps 6.2.1 Security improvements
Messaging ratchet for intra-subsession forward secrecy We already have forward secrecy for old subsessions, but this is important for long-running subsessions and later when we do asynchronous messaging.
One simple scheme is to deterministically split the key into keys, one for each sender. Then, each key can be used to seed a hash-chain ratchet for its associated sender. Once all readers have decrypted a packet and deleted the key, the forward secrecy of messages encrypted with that key and previous ones is ensured. However, since this scheme does not distribute entropy between members, there is no chance to recover from a memory leak and try to regain secrecy for future messages.
Better membership change protocol Use a constant-round group key exchange such as that from [np1sec], or even pairwise [Triple-DH] between all group members which extends better to asynchronous messaging. In both cases, we get deniability for free without having to publish signature keys for messages.
Use peer-to-peer or anonymous transport for non-GKA messages The only part of our system that requires a linear ordering is the membership operation packets. So it is possible to move message packets into a transport that gives us better properties (e.g. against metadata analysis) than XMPP.
More functionality
Large messages and file transfer Our current padding scheme limits messages to roughly 2 16 bytes, to keep it under our XMPP server maximum stanza size. This may be extended to arbitrary sizes: pad to the next-power-of-2-multiple of the maximum size, and split this into MTU-sized packets. (This is just a functionality improvement; these padding schemes have not been researched from an adversarial model.) After this, it is a straightforward engineering task to allow file transfers.
Better multi-device support
A group messaging system can already be used for multiple devices in a very basic way -simply have each device join the session as a separate member. This is desireable for security reasons, since it means we can avoid sharing ephemeral keys. It's unclear whether devices should share identity keys, or use different identity keys and have the PKI layer bind them to say "we are the same identity", but this decision doesn't affect our messaging system.
Beyond this, we can add some things both in the messaging layer and in the UI layer to make the experience smoother for users.
• The users view should show one entry per user, not per device;
• Not-fully-acked warnings may be tweaked to only require one ack from every user rather than every device. However, a warning should probably fired eventually even if all devices don't ack it, just later 6.2. Next stepsthan in the single device case; it is still a critical security error if different devices get different content. Similar logic may be applied to heartbeats;
• There are extra corner cases in the browser case, where the user may open several tabs (each acting as a separate device), with crashes and page reloads causing churn that might reveal implementation bugs.
(We are already doing some of the above.)
Sync old session history across devices It is unnecessary to reuse security credentials (e.g. shared group keys or session keys) that are linked to others -we already decrypted the packets and don't need to do this again. Futher, credentials in modern protocols are supposed to be ephemeral, and this is a vital part of their security. If we retain such credentials, we may put others at risk or leave forensic traces of our own activities.
Therefore, our sync mechanism must not directly reuse ciphertext from our messaging protocol, since it forces us to store these credentials. It is much better to re-encrypt the plaintext under our own keys, unlinked to anyone else. That is, at the very least, this feature must be a separate protocol; the security model here is private storage for oneself, and not private communications. Finally, even following this requirement, long-term storage of encrypted data directly counteracts forward secrecy, so the user must be made aware of this before such a feature is enabled.
Research
Here are some research topics for the future for which we have no concrete solution proposals, though we do have some vague suggestions.
Several of these relate to "no-compromise" asynchronous messaging, i.e. with causal ordering, no breaking of symmetry between members, no requirement of temporary synchronity or total ordering, no accept-reject mechanisms, and no dependency on external infrastructure.
Merging under partial visibility
As mentioned earlier, our membership operations are in a total order because nobody has defined how to merge two group key agreements. This problem has a well-defined solution for pairwise key agreements, but only if everyone can see all history, or if only member inclusions are allowed (or generally, if the operations to be merged have no inverse). If we have partial visibility (i.e. members can't see events from before they join) and we want to support both member inclusion and exclusion, the solution is unknown.
Session rejoin semantics
As part of solving the above point, we need to decide what parent references mean exactly in the context of rejoining a session. Existing members' parent references to older messages won't make sense to us since we can't see them; symmetrically, we might want to reference the last messages we saw before previously leaving the session, but these references might not make sense to some of the existing members, i.e. those not present when we parted.
Possible hybrid solution
One possible solution is to allow causally-ordered member inclusion, but require that everyone acknowledge a member exclusion before it is considered complete. Then our partial visibility problem disappears; new members don't have to worry about how to merge in excludes that happened before they joined -their inviter will have already taken this into account. This is probably the least non-zero "compromise" solution, but the agreement mechanism might itself be very complex.
Save and load current session This is vital for asynchronous messaging, and would be a straightforward but significant engineering effort on top of our existing implementation.
One optimisation to be made after the basic ability is complete, is to prune older messages from our transcript and message-log data structures. This must be thought through carefully, since we need a limited set of history in order to perform ratcheting, check the full-ack status of messages and freshness of other members, and merge concurrent membership operations.
Membership change policy protocol
This ought to be layered on top of a membership change mechanism protocol. When reasoning about security, naturally one considers who is allowed to do what. But authorization is a separate issue from how to execute membership changes. We should solve the latter first, assuming that all members are allowed to make any change (in many cases this is exactly what is desired), then think about how to construct a secure mechanism to restrict these operations based on some user-defined policy. This is the same reason why we generally perform authentication before, and separately from, authorization.
